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Toward Global Welfare State Convergence?:
Family Policy and Health Care
in Sweden, Canada and the United States
GREGG M. OLSEN
University of Manitoba
Department of Sociology
Accounts of the welfare state and the dynamics governing its de-
velopment have been pivotal and highly contentious in the social
policy literature over the past few decades. Since the 1980s, research
has suggested that, as a result of domestic pressures and strains
and/or the impact of globalization, welfare states were declining in
tandem. However, most of these studies were quantitativefocusing
upon 18 or more advanced capitalist nations and, in their search to
uncover broad cross-national trends, utilized narrow welfare state
indicators. This study investigates the extent to which the social
democratic welfare state in Sweden, the social liberal welfare state
in Canada, and the liberal welfare state in the United States have
converged. It takes a qualitative approach, examining the character
of the income security and social service programs in two broad
policy domains-family policy and health care--and concludes
that the welfare states in the three nations remain distinct, while
acknowledging some broadly similar trends and new developments.
Keywords: convergence, globalization, policy domains, program-
matic and structural change, crisis, family policy, health care
policy, income security/maintenance, social services
Introduction
Accounts of the welfare state and the dynamics
governing its development have been pivotal and highly
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contentious in the social policy literature over the past few
decades. In the 1980s numerous studies from across the po-
litical spectrum declared that they were everywhere in crisis,
beset by new unremitting pressures and constraints which
would ultimately lead to their demise. Subsequent research,
however, disputed these bleak accounts of inevitable cross-
national convergence, highlighting significant variation in the
face of widespread and broadly similar cutbacks and reforms
(cf. e.g., Alber, 1988; Mishra 1984; O'Connor, 1973).
Since the 1990s the focus has shifted toward the impact
of global integration, but the debate has been very similar.
Studies describing or predicting a cross-national race-to-the-
bottom suggested that increasingly permeable borders in the
spheres of commerce, production and finance have set increas-
ingly stringent limits on state autonomy and national policy
options, whatever the nature of domestic public opinion
or political stripe of incumbent governments (Clayton and
Pontusson, 1998; Fulcher, 1994; Gilbert, 2002; Goodman and
Pauly,1993; Mishra, 1999). But the conclusions of these studies
have also been challenged. Some researchers were skeptical
of the globalization thesis itself, noting that most developed
welfare states have often been found in nations, such as the
Nordic lands, with the most open borders because comprehen-
sive networks of social policies can greatly minimize econom-
ic uncertainty and socio-political instability (Cameron, 1978;
Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Rodrik,1998). Others largely ac-
cepted the idea of a downward pressure exerted by economic
integration but argued that the forces of globalization are re-
fracted through very different conditions, institutions, and his-
torical traditions across nations, rendering welfare states more
or less vulnerable to these forces and preventing any form of
meaningful convergence (cf. Bradley et al., 2005; Castles, 2004;
Huber and Stephens, 2001: Navarro et al., 2004; Olsen, 2002;
Swank, 2002).
Despite their varying conclusions, most studies address-
ing the fate of welfare states to date have been quantitative,
utilizing large aggregate data sets and narrow welfare-state
indicators amenable to statistical analysis, such as levels of
social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, replacement rate
levels for major transfer programs, or public employment as a
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percentage of total employment. Although they have proven
invaluable, these studies are limited by their restricted range of
indicators. As often pointed out, a higher level of social welfare
spending in a nation does not necessarily indicate greater
welfare commitment; rather, it might simply reflect greater
need spurred by higher levels of unemployment, population
aging, or increases in the costs of program delivery. Moreover,
the inclusion of 18 or more nations in most of these studies pre-
cludes a close examination of the general character of welfare
states, including their commitment to social equality and social
justice, and some their key social policy components, such as
social services. In response, this study provides a close, quali-
tative account of two central social policy domains in each
of three nations with different policy approaches-Sweden,
Canada and the United States.
The U.S. welfare state has often been characterized as ru-
dimentary. It is the quintessential liberal "social safety net,"
providing a relatively restricted range of social protections and
services, meagre income benefits, and few programs as a right
of citizenship or residence. The restricted nature of the U.S.
welfare state reflects a commitment to a narrow conception of
equal opportunity, a negative expression of liberty-freedom
from the state-and limited government, helping to explain its
higher levels of poverty and smaller middle class (cf. Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Olsen, 2002).
Sweden's welfare state, in contrast, has often been heralded
(or condemned) as archetypal, the apex of social policy evolu-
tion to date. Categorized as institutional, social democratic and
encompassing, it covers a wider range of social contingencies
than most nations and provides generous social transfers and
a dense network of high quality social services. And many
of the benefits it furnishes are provided as a right (or a proto-
right) to all permanent residents. Its relatively large middle
class, longstanding concern with full employment and the
elimination of poverty, and broad range of "family-friendly"
and "women-friendly" social programs reflect a greater com-
mitment to equality of condition and freedomfor the state.
Although often classified with its U.S. counterpart, the
Canadian welfare state has been characterized as "social
liberal," reflecting a greater commitment to state intervention
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and lower levels of inequality. Canada's welfare state also pro-
vides more universal social program entitlements, and more
comprehensive risk coverage. And while Canadian trans-
fer programs have been less generous than those in most of
Europe, they have typically been more supportive than those
in the U.S. (Olsen, 2002, 1994; Olsen and Brym, 1996).
Welfare states are comprised of a comprehensive network
of protective legislation, income transfers and social services
across a wide range of policy domains. It would be virtu-
ally impossible to determine if there has been a convergence
across welfare states, even if the focus is upon only these three
nations. Therefore, this study focuses on the central income
transfer programs and social services in two central policy
areas-family policy and health care policy. It is argued that,
despite some notable changes and trends in all three nations,
the character of their welfare states has remained distinct in
these policy domains.
Family Policy
Family policy is a broad, encompassing area that is not
as clearly demarcated as other policy domains, especial-
ly in Sweden where it has been very closely linked to labor
market and gender equality policy. Family policy typologies
have tended to place Sweden in a "pro-egalitarian" category.
Swedish policies have sought to create greater opportunities
for women to enter and remain in the labor force and to recon-
struct traditional gender roles by, for example, encouraging
men to play a larger role in childcare. While the family policy
approaches in the U.S. and Canada are more noted for their
"gender neutral" approach and for targeting poor families,
there are also important differences between these two North
American nations (Gauthier 1996; Ergas, 1990). Although
Sweden provides a much wider range of supports for families
than Canada and the U.S., the discussion here will be largely
limited to the two central family policy transfers-family al-
lowances and maternity/parental leaves-and one key social
service, childcare.
Income Security I: Family Allowances
Family allowances are among the most important income
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transfers provided to households with children. They provide
a basic income supplement to all families with children (typi-
cally under 16 years of age). Sweden's universal, flat-rate, tax-
exempt allowance provides benefits which have been among
the most generous in the advanced capitalist world since it was
introduced in 1948. The per-child monthly benefit level was
lowered in 1996 from 750 SEK ($US 109) to 640 SEK (US $93),
but was raised again to 950 SEK ($US 138) in 2001. Families are
also entitled to an extended allowance for children who turn
16, provided that they are still in school (until they complete
their secondary education) as well as several other allowances
for children who require special care.
Canada implemented its universal family allowance system
in 1944, but benefit levels were comparatively low, encourag-
ing a reliance upon supplementary means-tested transfer pro-
grams and other fiscal measures. Moreover, Canada's family
allowance benefits were de-indexed in the 1980s, abolished in
1992 and replaced by a refundable tax credit, the Child Tax
Benefit (CTB) the following year. This development marked
the end of universal income benefits and an increasing reliance
upon fiscal measures in Canada (Myles 1998).
Virtually alone in the advanced capitalist world, the U.S.
has never provided a universal family allowance program,
relying instead upon targeted, means-tested programs such
as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a
central and long-standing measure that was replaced with the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program (TANF)
in 1996. However, unlike AFDC, TANF is not an entitlement
available to all who meet eligibility requirements, and it has a
maximum five-year, lifetime limit. The most central means of
assistance in the U.S. today is the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), but it only assists the working poor and requires a tax
form to determine eligibility (Goldberg, 2001; Karger, 2003).
Thus, unlike Sweden, where family allowances actually have
been improved, the programs in Canada and U.S. have become
less inclusive and support levels have deteriorated for many
recipients.
Income Security II: Maternity/Parental Leave Programs
Programs which enable parents to stay at home to care
for young children are another central income security
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component of family policy. Sweden, a pioneer and leader in
this policy area, has provided support for mothers via state
subsidies to voluntary sickness societies since 1891. In 1900 a
new Workers Protection Act ensured that women did not have
to return to factory work for four weeks (extended to six in
1912) after giving birth and the nation's first paid maternity in-
surance scheme was introduced in 1931. Although it provided
modest economic support for new working mothers at first,
it became increasingly generous over the ensuing years. By
1974 it was converted from a maternity leave program into a
parental leave program, and both the benefit period and the
income replacement levels were incrementally raised over the
next two decades.
Today Sweden's parental leave program is extremely gen-
erous by international standards, providing income support
for 16 months. Each parent must take at least two months of
leave and the remaining months can be shared between both
parents as they see fit. Parents receive an income replacement
rate of 80% for the first thirteen months of leave and a flat-rate
for the last three months. Parents without any income receive
the flat-rate for the entire 16-month period. All parents are
also entitled to an additional three months of unpaid leave.
Moreover, they are free to take the benefit at any time before
the child's eighth birthday. Universal paternity leaves are also
provided in Sweden, entitling fathers to ten days of paid leave
(at 80%) after the birth or adoption of each child to allow them
to share in the care of new family members.
While space limitations prevent an examination of several
related Swedish programs, three other entitlements should be
acknowledged here: (1) a "pregnancy benefit" paid to expect-
ant mothers with physically demanding jobs so they do not
have to work; (2) ten paid "contact days" per child, per year,
allowing parental involvement in their child's daycare or el-
ementary school activities, and (3) up to 60 days per child, per
year of "sickness benefits" to enable parents to stay home to
care for sick children under the age of 12 (or 16 years under
special circumstances). Like parental and paternity leaves and
other insurance programs in Sweden, all three of these entitle-
ments replace 80% of the recipient's income.
Programs for parents in Canada have not been nearly as
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supportive or had as long a history as those in Sweden but
they provide considerably more support than those in the
U.S. Canada unconventionally introduced its maternity leave
program within the framework of its unemployment insur-
ance (UI) scheme in 1971 (1984 for adoptive parents) providing
only fifteen weeks of benefits and leaving parents to rely upon
other forms of support in the private sector. Because maternity
leave has been part of the UI scheme (styled El, employment
insurance, since 1996), income replacement rates have fallen
with cuts to this program (currently at 55%, up to a ceiling ).
However, in 1990 the length of the leave was extended by ten
weeks to be shared between mothers and fathers (biological
or adoptive) at the same income replacement rate. In 2001 the
parental leave period was increased to 35 weeks, a significant
program expansion during the period of globalization. And,
in Quebec, arguably the nation's most European and social
democratic province, parental leave became somewhat more
generous and inclusive in 2006, providing higher earnings
replacements, allowing recipients the option to claim higher
benefit levels for shorter periods, and extending coverage to
the self-employed.
Exceptional again, the U.S. is one of the few developed cap-
italist nations which does not provide statutory, paid mater-
nity, parental or paternity leave. Twelve weeks of family leave
have been available to mothers of newborns or newly adopted
children through the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, but
this is an unpaid scheme that only applies to employees who
meet certain employment conditions and work in firms with
50 or more employees-roughly 46% of the employed popula-
tion of the United States (OECD, 2001:151). Although the U.S.
remains a notable laggard in this policy area, all three nations
experienced some program expansion over the past 15 years,
but the differences in the character and levels of support re-
mained firm across them.
Family Services: Childcare
The major social service provided in the family policy
domain is childcare. Sweden has been actively committed
to developing its existing childcare system since 1974. By
1995 all parents who were working or studying were legally
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entitled to spaces for their children. Almost 75% of children
aged 15 months to 6 years of age receive some form of child-
care through the public sector. Most of these children (53%)
are enrolled in municipal daycare centers, but some (12%) are
cared for in family daycares by municipal childminders or in
publicly-subsidized private daycare centers (7%). Although
parents pay income-related fees to access Sweden's public
childcare system, it is largely financed through municipal tax
revenue and grants from the central government.
Like most public services in Sweden, childcare is admin-
istered at the local level by municipal authorities but closely
regulated by the central government to ensure that the provi-
sion of care is consistent across the nation's 289 municipali-
ties. Childcare in Sweden is of a uniformly high quality, ser-
viced by highly-educated and well-trained workers. Childcare
group sizes are relatively low and have relatively low child-to-
staff ratios. And most childcare centers have adequate space,
meet high health and safety standards, and have well-devel-
oped activities and programs. They also foster close links with
parents and have flexible hours to accommodate the need and
demands of parents' work and school schedules.
Again contradicting the suggestions of many globaliza-
tion/convergence theorists, Sweden's public childcare system
has grown dramatically over the past few decades-a remark-
able development given the substantial increase in the number
of children born in the early 1990s. Waiting lists have virtu-
ally disappeared and the number of spaces provided largely
conforms to current needs. Moreover, childcare has become
increasingly formal, collectivized, and public, reflecting de-
clines in unpaid and unregulated care, private-sector daycare,
and public and private residential/family care. And, while the
number of publicly-subsidized private childcare spaces has in-
creased in recent years, most of these have been in parents'
cooperatives, worker cooperatives and other non-profit orga-
nizations, a development that does not reflect a marked trend
toward privatization or marketization.
Despite this expansion, there were some jarring cutbacks to
the Swedish childcare system in the 1990s. For example, some
municipal childcare centers moved to smaller, less expensive
quarters and/or offered reduced flexibility in their hours of
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operation. Larger groups of children enrolled in public daycare
and a reduction of personnel increased the average child-to-
staff ratio in some childcare centers from 4:1 to 6:1, increasing
stress levels among childcare workers. Parental user fees also
increased, comprising over 17% of the gross costs of public
childcare in Sweden by the end of the 1990s. And, amidst
record-high levels of unemployment in the early 1990s, many
municipalities (40%) adopted new rules denying childcare
spaces to families with an unemployed parent. As in other
parts of the Swedish welfare state, central government control
over childcare was weakened. Although the national govern-
ment continued to set goals for the municipalities, decentral-
ization and the abolition of state regulations gave local author-
ities somewhat greater freedom to decide how to meet those
goals, resulting in less uniform provision and costs across the
nation (Bergmark, 1997; Palme et al., 2002; Szebehely, 1998).
However, the government instituted a maximum fees reform
in 1993 to contain the cost of childcare and limit variation
across municipalities while respecting their autonomy. It also
strengthened the right of the unemployed and those on paren-
tal leave to access childcare.
If Sweden's network of universally accessible childcare
services best approximates a "maximum public responsibility"
childcare model, the approach taken in Canada and the U.S.
more closely approximates the "maximum private respon-
sibility" model according to one OECD study (Ergas, 1990).
Governments in both of these nations have been reluctant to
assume full responsibility for the provision of services; neither
of them has introduced national childcare legislation or uni-
versal childcare programs. Informal unlicensed, unregulated
childcare in its various forms is more widespread in Canada
and the U.S. than in most other developed nations. Indeed,
private (non-profit and for-profit) fee-for-service childcare
programs accessed through the market constitute the major
component of formal care in both nations. Parental fees cover
most of the childcare costs in these nations. And, various fiscal
measures-tax deductions, credits, allowances, exemptions
and other forms of relief-are typically utilized to help parents
purchase childcare services in the market and to encourage the
provision of employer-sponsored care to a significantly greater
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degree than they are in Sweden and most other nations.
Childcare in Canada, like the majority of other social ser-
vices, is a provincial/territorial responsibility. But, unlike
healthcare or education, it is not a mandatory service, so the
provinces and territories rarely operate childcare programs or
ensure that they are in place. Coverage rates in formal child-
care settings across age groups are relatively low in Canada,
and there are wide variations in accessibility as well as in the
affordability and quality of childcare centers across the nation.
One prominent counter development in Canada in this area,
however was the creation of a $5-a-day CDN (now $7-a-day)
public childcare program in the province of Quebec which has
been steadily increasing its number of spaces since its intro-
duction in 1997. Outside of Quebec, however, there has been
little evidence of improvement on the Canadian scene. Indeed,
the minority Conservative government that assumed power
in the2006 federal election scrapped the previous Liberal gov-
ernment's plans to establish a universal, accessible child-care
program and instituted a monthly 'Child Care Allowance' of
$100.00 CDN that covers only a small fraction of childcare costs
and does not address the urgent need for more spaces.
Childcare provision in the U.S. is uneven across the states,
but the proportion of children in formal care is greater there
than in Canada. Childcare quality is generally inadequate, in
part due to the low pay provided to child care workers and the
consequent difficulty in recruiting or retaining qualified per-
sonnel. High quality childcare is very costly in the U.S., where
parental fees cover 76% of childcare costs. As in Canada, the
use of the tax system to offset childcare costs to parents has
disproportionately benefitted higher-income earners. Because
fiscal measures do not fund childcare services directly, they do
little to increase access or significantly reduce costs for most
families. Affordable, accessible, regulated childcare that meets
even minimum standards remains in severe shortage in both
Canada and the U.S. (Boushey, et al., 2001; Kamerman, 2000;
OECD, 2001; Prentice, 1999). The situation in these two nations
contrasts markedly with the general expansion that occurred
in Sweden during the same period.
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Health Care
Health care is another central social policy pillar and one
of the most costly. The health care policy domain includes
two broad kinds of measures-sickness insurance, the income
security component, and health care, the social services com-
ponent. The three nations examined here have taken unmis-
takably different health care approaches. Canada and the U.S.
have lagged behind Sweden and most of Europe in this policy
area. However, while comparatively late, Canada, unlike the
U.S., did mount a national health insurance plan in the 1970s,
and many of its provinces had begun to introduce hospitaliza-
tion and medical care insurance programs much earlier.
Income Security: Sickness Insurance
Although much less familiar in the North American context,
sickness insurance is a central social insurance program with
a long history in many European nations. Sickness insurance
provides benefits to ensure financial security for people whose
ability to work is reduced due to illness for relatively short
periods (after which work injury or disability insurance may
apply). Sweden's universal sickness insurance scheme was
established in 1955, replacing the existing state-subsidized,
but voluntary sickness fund scheme. It is among the most gen-
erous schemes in existence today, providing 80% income re-
placement levels for those who must take time off from work
when they become ill. Moreover, employees do not have to
endure the long uncompensated waiting periods common in
many other nations. Sickness insurance regulations were re-
peatedly adjusted in the 1990s, largely at the request of em-
ployers who believed the benefits were too easy to access.
Since 1998, employees have not received public benefits during
the first 14 days of illness but their employers are legally re-
quired to provide sickness compensation during this period,
except for the first day which, since 1993, is unpaid. Perhaps
most remarkably, there has been no formal limit on the dura-
tion of the sickness compensation period. However, claimants
who are incapacitated for over a year may be considered for
a temporary or permanent disability pension. Occupational
rehabilitation programs, including assessments, work testing,
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and work training and other cash benefits have also been avail-
able to those on sick leave. The only significant change to the
Swedish sickness insurance scheme was a decrease in income
replacement levels from 90% to 80% (in 1993) and then to 75%
(in 1996). But, as with Ul and parental insurance, benefit levels
were returned to 80% in 1998.
Unlike Sweden, Canada has not established a separate
sickness insurance program. However, time-limited sickness
benefits have been available in Canada since 1971 through its
UI program. Of course, this has meant that income replace-
ment rates, the duration of the benefit period, the number of
waiting days before compensation begins, and other rules and
conditions of Canada's sickness insurance scheme, as with its
leave programs, have moved in lockstep with changes to UI.
Moreover, unlike UI, sickness benefits have been means-tested
in Canada, taking into account certain other income that ben-
eficiaries might be receiving (such as sickness benefits from an
occupational plan, for example). Despite these limitations, and
a decline in benefit levels, Canadians remain much better off
than their counterparts in the U.S., where there has been no na-
tional public sickness insurance program. A few states, such as
California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island,
have introduced programs to protect loss of income during
illness. But most Americans wishing to have such protection
must turn to the private sector, and many simply cannot afford
adequate or even any coverage (Kangas 1991; RFV 1999).
Health Care Services
The provision of health care services in Canada, Sweden
and the U.S. is even more strikingly different than that of sick-
ness insurance. Of course, at a highly abstract level, the health
care services in these three nations look somewhat similar;
they all emphasize curative intervention over health promo-
tion. However, the three models differ in the range and quality
of the primary and specialty services they furnish, the extent
to which they challenge or defer to market forces, their em-
phasis on prevention, and extent of population coverage. Here
we will focus primarily upon the general character of health
care services and the way they are financed and delivered in
order to contrast the three national models and track recent
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developments.
Sweden has developed what is sometimes referred to as a
"national health service"model of care. In many ways it is quite
similar to Britain's more familiar public health care model
because both the financing and delivery of health care services
are carried out through the public sector. Most Swedish hos-
pitals, local primary care health centers, child and maternity
clinics and so on, are publicly-owned and administered. And
the great majority of physicians, nurses, midwives, and other
health care professionals, and about half of all dentists, are sal-
aried, public sector workers. Comprehensive and high quality
primary and speciality health care services are available to all
as a right of residence (Holt and Cohn, 1995).
Unlike in Britain, however, the provision of health care
in Sweden is highly decentralized, a hallmark of the Swedish
welfare state generally. Health care is largely organized on a
county basis and is clearly dominated by the county councils.
Most hospitals, clinics and centers are owned by the county
authorities and most health care providers are county employ-
ees. Moreover, health care is largely financed through income
taxes levied by the county councils (about 61% of total costs).
However, while the county councils clearly play the central
role in the planning, provision and financing of health care in
Sweden, the national government has also been a significant
player, laying down key principles through the creation of di-
rectives, regulations, legislation, and ordinances. The Ministry
of Health and Social Affairs draws up guidelines and sets na-
tional policy goals for the counties while several other national
agencies monitor and evaluate developments and advise the
government. The central government has also attempted to co-
ordinate county health care systems by, for example, instituting
a national pay scale for all hospital employees and restricting
hospital doctors to salary only remuneration. Sweden's phar-
macies were also brought under public ownership and control
by the central government and combined into one agency, the
National Pharmacy Company (Apoteksbolaget), which is re-
sponsible for the purchase and distribution of drugs. Finally,
the national government also helps to finance the delivery
of health care by the counties through health insurance and
various forms of grants and payments (about 35% of total
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costs).
While health care in Sweden is socialized--overwhelming-
ly financed and provided by the public sector-it is not always
free. Certain services, such as birth control counseling, mater-
nity care, and life-saving drugs, are provided without charge.
But patients pay user fees for many other services, including
hospitalization, a visit to a family practitioner or clinic, lab tests,
and other forms of treatment from physiotherapists, occupa-
tional therapists, speech therapists and nurses. Set by county
councils, user fees vary across the counties, but residents in
Sweden generally pay about $30 (US) for a visit to the hospital
and approximately $15 (US) to see the family doctor or use a
primary care facility or clinic. These charges reflect incremental
increases over the past few decades and an attempt to limit un-
necessary overuse of the Swedish health care system. However,
the fees are still relatively low, and those under 20 years of age
do not pay for medical or dental care. Moreover, the relatively
low annual ceiling or upper limit on the maximum amount a
family pays for medical care, dental care, and pharmaceuticals
remains in place (approximately $170.00 US).
Much more significant than the increase in user fees has
been the notably greater role of markets in the provision
of health care in Sweden since the 1980s. Increased patient
choice of healthcare providers and the adoption of purchaser-
provider models that allow county councils to simply pur-
chase services from other public or private providers that run
and manage them, were among the first market reforms in-
troduced. In some cases, county councils have even encour-
aged the public health care providers in their jurisdictions to
foster a corporate management approach and compete with
one another. In other cases, they have restructured their hos-
pitals as joint stock companies in an attempt to transform them
into managerially independent operations with responsibility
for raising and spending their own budgets. The county coun-
cils have typically maintained control over all of the company
shares, but three acute care hospitals were recently privatized.
While this might be a symbolically important change, the vast
majority of Sweden's hospitals are still owned and run by
county authorities. The number of private, for-profit primary
care centers, however, has expanded dramatically. Virtually
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non-existent in the early 1980s, they now comprise almost 12%
of the total number in the nation, but most of them are publicly
financed via contracts with the county councils. Other legis-
lative reforms have enabled doctors to work in private prac-
tices on a fee-for-service basis and fostered the introduction
of private health care insurance schemes, although neither of
these developments has been very widespread. While it may
not represent the seismic or revolutionary shift claimed by pro-
ponents of market reform in Sweden and abroad, these devel-
opments are not insignificant. However, Sweden's health care
system still maintains its definitive characteristics, including a
considerably greater emphasis upon the public financing and
delivery of health care than is found in most other advanced
capitalist nations.
Canada's national health insurance model is similar to
Sweden's in many ways. It too is based upon the idea of collec-
tive responsibility for shared vulnerabilities and ensures com-
prehensive coverage for all of its long-term residents. As in
Sweden, health care is the responsibility of sub-central govern-
ments. Indeed, the Canadian model, better known as "medi-
care", is best described as an interlocking set of ten provincial
and three territorial health insurance schemes which collec-
tively comprise a national health care insurance system. And,
health care is largely publicly financed by various levels of
government through taxation and grants.The Canadian health
care approach is based upon a single-payer system in which
the government is the main purchaser of most of the primary
and speciality health care services provided. However, the de-
livery of health care in the two nations is quite distinct. Unlike
in Sweden, most health care services in Canada are not pro-
vided by the state. Rather, they are typically furnished by non-
profit organizations and hospitals and physicians working
from private offices (Olsen, 2002, 1994).
Constitutionally, Canadian health care falls under the ju-
risdiction of the provincial and territorial governments but
the federal government sets national standards to ensure
uniformity in quality and access across the nation. In order to
qualify for federal funding, provincial and territorial health
plans have had to comply with five familiar central principles:
universality, comprehensiveness, accessibility, portability, and
158 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
public administration. However, the national government's
presence has diminished over the years as federal funding has
generally declined and taken the form of unconditional block
grants rather than cost-sharing. Concomitant with this devel-
opment has been a number of other significant trends, includ-
ing a reduction in the number of hospital beds, the de-listing
of drugs covered, the privatization of some services, the intro-
duction or expansion of user fees for some services in some
provinces, longer waiting lists, and lengthier waiting periods
to access certain services (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1996;
Fuller, 1998).
The U.S. has an entrepreneurial health care system. The
private market is dominant in both the financing and the
provision of health care, and state involvement is much less
extensive than in the other two nations. Only about 20% of
the U.S. population is covered by two major publicly-financed
programs, Medicare (12%) for the elderly, and Medicaid (7%),
for the poor. However, over 30% of the poor in the U.S. do
not have health care insurance according to the U.S. Census
Bureau. And 15% of the U.S. population-close to 45 million
people-did not have any health care insurance in 2002, an
increase of 1.5 million since 2001. The numbers with health
care coverage have been declining in the U.S. in part because
of reduced levels of employment-based coverage with the
recent proliferation of low-wage, insecure jobs. Many families
were also pushed off Medicaid with the elimination of AFCD.
Although they were still eligible for Medicaid (with the excep-
tion of those who refused work), many families did not know
they were eligible. According to the Urban Institute there were
500,000 fewer people participating in Medicaid in 1996, one
year after AFDC was eliminated. However, since then, many
states undertook to increase awareness of the program and the
numbers of people using Medicaid increased significantly.
The health care approaches in all three nations are based
upon a mainstream biomedical model which defines health
as the absence of disease and views illness as primarily
determined by genetics, external pathogens, degeneration
associated with aging, and poor choices made by
individuals rather than by poverty and socio-economic in-
equality. Consequently, their health care systems are all
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physician and hospital intensive, emphasizing curative
medical intervention over prevention. Of course, health care
systems play a very important role relieving suffering, restor-
ing functioning and prolonging life. In nations such as Canada,
where health care is provided universally, life expectancy does
not vary with income as much as it does in the U.S., where
millions of people cannot afford any or adequate health care.
But the socio-economic determinants of the symptoms which
health care systems identify and suppress often go largely
unaddressed. Not surprisingly, this is somewhat less true of
Sweden than of Canada and, especially, the U.S. (Robbins,
1989; Wilkinson, 2005).
Most nations have increased their concern with prevention
in recent years, passing laws, introducing educational cam-
paigns to modify behavior, and encouraging medical testing
for several increasingly common chronic diseases. Sweden
has passed (and enforced) more protective environmental
and workplace legislation, removed more barriers to afford-
able housing, and provided a wider range of other preventive
programs-such as universal maternity care, child health care,
school health services and other health insurance programs
which make it easier for children and others to stay home
when they are sick-than most other nations. In the U.S., in
contrast, environmental programs and regulatory activities
and agencies have been pared back markedly since the 1980s
and a renewed emphasis has been placed upon changing nar-
rowly-defined, individual "lifestyle choices", such as tobacco
use, drug use, and inactivity, while ignoring their class context.
Convergence is least detectable in this policy area; while cut-
backs to the Canadian health care system have been neither
minor nor inconsequential, the approaches taken in the three
nations remain distinct.
Conclusion
Globalization theorists and resilience theorists have reached
very different conclusions about the development of welfare
states over the past two decades. While the former maintain
that the economic logic of global integration has resulted in the
erosion of national autonomy and strict social policy austerity
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across the affluent capitalist world, the latter suggest that, for a
variety of reasons, some nations have been much better placed
to resist it. Sweden's still very powerful labor movement-re-
flected in virtually unparalleled unionization rates and the rel-
atively steady incumbency of its Social Democratic Labor Party
(SAP)-unitary parliamentary state structures with relatively
few veto points, and more collectivist and state-friendly cul-
tural traditions rooted in its feudal past have provided a good
measure of insulation from the forces of globalization. The ex-
traordinarily weak labor movement, highly fragmented presi-
dential and federal state structures, and long-standing cultural
traditions emphasizing individualism and antipathy toward
the state in the U.S. have led it to embrace neo-liberalism and
provided little resistance to economic integration. Canada's
position between these two nations along these socio-political
and socio-cultural dimensions no doubt helps to account for
its continuing social policy position between Swedish social
democracy and American exceptionalism (for an overview, see
Olsen, 2002).
This examination of the major income programs and
social services in two central social policy domains in Sweden,
Canada and the United States here suggests that, despite some
erosion and restructuring, there has not been a convergence.
The character of the welfare state in each nation has generally
remained intact, although the social policy patterns are consid-
erably more complicated and subtle when Canada and the U.S.
are closely contrasted. These two liberal nations have become
more similar in certain policy areas while diverging markedly
or remaining unchanged in others.
In the family policy domain, it is notable that all three
nations actually expanded their provision of maternity/paren-
tal leave in the 1990s. However, Sweden has clearly maintained
its position as a leader in this domain; it continues to provide an
extensive and generous range of income support measures as
well as high-quality, universal childcare. Both Canada and the
U.S. eliminated their central family income entitlements and
introduced new fiscal measures (CTB and EITC, respectively)
in the mid-1990s. But Canada greatly extended the length of
its parental leave program and now provides nearly a year of
combined maternity/parental leave. While the U.S. may have
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taken an unexpected policy step with the introduction of its
family leave program in 1993, it remains out of step with most
of the advanced capitalist world; the program covers only a
minority of workers and provides no financial compensation,
so many of those who need it most cannot take advantage of
it.
It is in the health policy domain that there clearly has been
the least convergence and the varied approaches in the three
nations remain quite distinct. Nevertheless, several recent de-
velopments have pushed Canada somewhat closer toward
the U.S. While Canada, unlike the U.S., still maintains a sick-
ness insurance program, the benefit has become harder to
access and income replacement levels have declined signifi-
cantly. Even in area of health care services, where the differ-
ences between the two nations remain most stark, there have
been some notable developments. In addition to the cutbacks
and retrenchment in the Canadian health care system, some
convergence has been set in motion by a failure to adjust the
Canadian health care system to current needs and trends, as
indicated by the recent Commission on the Future of Health
Care in Canada (2002). In its early days, the Commission notes,
medicare in Canada largely revolved around the provision of
hospital care and the services of doctors. But the centrality of
these healthcare components has been steadily declining over
the past 25 years. Better drugs and improved day-surgery pro-
cedures have allowed hospitals to discharge patients much
sooner and home care has increasingly become a substitute for
longer periods of convalescence in hospital. But pharmaceuti-
cals-once only a relatively small portion of total health care
costs but now the second biggest expense-are not covered
in Canada. And home care is only adequately covered. These
developments and higher expenses mean that, as in the U.S.,
health care costs are more likely to bankrupt lower-income
families today.
The trends observed across the nations in these two policy
domains will not necessarily be the same across and within
other social policy domains. In the area of old age policy, for
example, more substantial restructuring appears to have take
place in Sweden and other social democratic nations (Olsen,
1999; Szebehely, 1998). Such variation across nations and
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policy areas demonstrates that quantitative studies of numer-
ous nations using a narrow range of indicators do not capture
the complexity of policy shifts and provide an incomplete
picture of the social policy landscape. Their breadth must be
balanced by the depth afforded by qualitative research that can
examine fewer policies in fewer nations, as the present study
has shown.
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